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OF CONTRACT, CULTURE, AND THE CODE:
JUDGE EASTERBROOK AND THE CHEYENNE
INDIANS
John M. Conley'
When I first read Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc.,2 I was drawn immediately to his breezy
remark, "Where's the sense in that?" 3 (This rhetorical question
was posed with respect to the contention that the Seventh
Circuit's earlier holding in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg4 should be
limited to software.) When I scanned down the page I saw an
equally striking reference to "competent adults" who are bound
by approve-or-return documents.
What struck me about both phrases was the cultural
assumptions they embody. Sense and competency are neither
idiosyncratic nor universal. They are instead cultural constructs,
dependent on shared understandings about how the world works.
Hill v. Gateway is thus a cultural decision, built upon - or
perhaps imposing - shared understandings of what constitutes
reasonable knowledge in the twenty-first century commercial
world.
Judge Easterbrook's interjection, however inadvertently,
of cultural concerns into the Gateway 2000 decision led me to
begin pondering the larger issue of the relevance of anthropology
to contract law. Several themes immediately came to mind.
STATUS AND CONTRACT
As it happens, contract law was one of the very first
issues to emerge in the anthropological study of law. It can be
plausibly argued that the first book that is recognizable as
anthropology was Henry James Sumner Maine's Ancient Law,
'William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor, University of North Carolina School of
Law, and Adjunct Professor of Cultural Anthroplogy, Duke University.
A.B., Harvard; J.D., Ph.D., Duke.
2 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).3 Id. at 1149.
4 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
5 Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1149.
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which appeared in 1861.6 Ancient Law was a grandiose effort to
impose the emerging evolutionary model (Darwin's Origin of
Species7 had appeared two years earlier, and evolution had been
in the air for more than a generation) on the study of law. Maine
endeavored to trace legal evolution from the earliest and most
'primitive' societies up to his own Victoria England.
Although Ancient Law is largely forgotten, one of
Maine's ideas enjoys continuing vitality: the fundamental
distinction between those societies where legal rights and
responsibilities are dependent upon a person's status and those
where rights and responsibilities are a matter of contract. In the
former sort of society, kinship tends to determine one's social
and legal fate; in the latter category, which is largely coterminous
with Western industrial society, people are presumed to be
autonomous individuals with the capacity to move in and out of
voluntary relationships with strangers.
Even in contemporary America, however, the distinction
is far from clear. Although we give nominal fealty to the ideal of
the autonomous individual, a quick glance at a law school course
catalog reveals numerous instances in which we predicate rights
and responsibilities solely or primarily on status. See, for
example, such subjects as the law of children, landlord/tenant
law, and, most relevant to these proceedings, consumer law.
Moreover, a lengthy ethnographic study of small claims courts
that I conducted with an anthropologist colleague revealed that
large numbers of competent lay adults in this society do not
appreciate our official contract orientation. 8 They go into court
believing in entitlements premised on their general social
rectitude, and are surprised and aggrieved when the law brings
them up short with such 'technicalities' as leases and contracts.
In the same vein, Robert Ellickson's Order Without Law9 depicts
a community of affluent Americans (northern California cattle
6 HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
7 CHARLES DARWIN, ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).
8 See JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS
RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990).
9 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991).
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ranchers) who regulate themselves according to their status as
neighbors, largely ignoring variable and changing legal rules.
Against this background, one can envision the Hills being
dragged by Judge Easterbrook across the status-contract
boundary, kicking and screaming.
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND MODERN CONTRACT
LAW
Indiana University law professor David Ray Papke has
made a persuasive case that the legal system of the Cheyenne
Indians had a direct influence on the American Uniform
Commerical Code ("UCC"). 10 Few lawyers are aware that
before beginning his work as principal draftsman of the UCC,
Karl Llewellyn co-authored, with the anthropologist E.A.
Hoebel, the classic legal ethnography The Cheyenne Way." By
interviewing elderly Cheyennes in the 1930s, Llewellyn and
Hoebel attempted to reconstruct the 'law-ways' of the Cheyenne
tribe as it roamed the Great Plains hunting buffalo and waging
war on neighboring tribes in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.
Although the Cheyenne had no written code or even unwritten
legal maxims, Llewellyn and Hoebel discovered that they applied
a consistent yet highly flexible set of principles and procedures to
the resolution of complex disputes in such diverse areas as
homicide, domestic relations, and property rights.
According to Papke, the Cheyenne experience strongly
influenced Llewellyn in a number of ways, both procedural and
substantive. On a general level, the UCC project and its product
were suffused with Llewellyn's ethnographic sensibility.' 2  As
early as 1930, he had criticized existing commercial law for its
"academic abstraction and remoteness from life."' 3 To remedy
10 David Ray Papke, How the Cheyenne Indians Wrote Article Two of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1457 (1999).
" KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941).
12 See Papke, supra note 10, at 1459-67.
13 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES ix
(1930).
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this, Llewellyn insisted that the drafters of the UCC pay close
attention to the day-to-day life of the marketplace. For example,
they conducted,
. . . three-day sessions every six to ten weeks
[with] a group of advisors which included experts
in the field of law concerned, experts in the field
of business or finance concerned, and also lawyers
or judges of general experience and no expertness
whose important business it was to see that it all
made sense and that each part could be understood
by men who were not experts .... There was
constant correspondence and consultation with any
experts in the business or law concerned who
could be discovered and who would give the
time. 14
Llewellyn characterized this process as "use-testing.' 15
Whereas prior law had often consisted of "some mere word-
formula which does not fit the situation and the situation's set of
problems," he believed that the new code was written in a
language "which really fits the need. " 16
Llewellyn's drafting process was novel in the legal world.
Before and since, the principal players in the process have
usually been legislators responding to special interests and law
professors offering theoretical prescriptions from ivory towers.
The empirical, ground-up process that. Llewellyn laid out for the
UCC was very much like the ethnography that he and Hoebel had
done among the Cheyennes. And the result is very much like the
practical, easily understood, and readily adaptable Cheyenne law-
ways that they discovered. Like the Cheyenne law-ways,
Llewellyn's UCC would emerge from and be consistent with its
cultural context, rather than being imposed from on high.
14 Karl N. Llewellyn, A Simple Case on Behalf of the Code (Statement to the
New York Law Revision Commission) (1954), reprinted in WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 530 (1973).
15 TWINING, supra note 14, at 531.
16 TWINING, supra note 14, at 538 (italics in original; Llewellyn was much-
given to italics).
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A number of substantive correspondences are also
evident. The structure of the UCC, for example, was unusual for
its time. It consists of nine major sections, or Articles. Article
One sets out a number of definitions that will apply code-wide;
the other eight Articles deal with specific areas of law - Article
Two on sales; Article Nine on secured transactions, etc. Many
of the key terms defined in Article One are highly amorphous
concepts that become meaningful only in specific applications:
things like agreement, 17 good faith, 18 course of dealing and usage
of the trade, 19 and "seasonable" action,20  for example.
Moreover, their meaning is to be determined in most cases by the
cultural norms of the marketplace. The result is that legal
outcomes across a broad range of commercial transactions
depend upon a relatively few culturally defined principles, and
these principles are themselves flexible in the extreme. This is
thoroughly reminiscent of Llewellyn's and Hoebel's view of the
adaptive genius of Cheyenne law.
On a more specific level, Papke has traced several
possible Cheyenne influences on Article Two. Papke's first
example concerns the formation of a sales contract. 21 In classic
contract law, the would-be parties must undergo a 'meeting of
the minds' for a contract to be formed. That is, there must be a
moment when both grasp the essential terms of the contract in
fundamentally similar ways. Absent persuasive evidence of a
meeting of the minds (a signed document or an unequivocal
conversation, for example), neither side will be able to enforce
the terms of the putative agreement against the other. Under
Article Two, by contrast, a binding contract can be formed in
any manner that the marketplace deems reasonable.22 As long as
competent members of the relevant trade or business community
would look at the circumstances and infer the existence of a
17 UCC § 1-201(3) (1993).
"s UCC § 1-201(19) (1993).
19 UCC § 1-205 (1993).
20 UCC § 1-204(3) (1993).
21 See Papke, supra note 10, at 1472-73.
2 See UCC §§ 1-204, 1-206, 1-207 (1993).
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contract, the law must do the same. If party A acted like it
wanted to order 10,000 bricks, and party B delivered them, A
could be forced to pay for them, regardless of the specific words
that had passed between them.23  The classic conceptual
definition of a contract has become practical, operational, and
culturally determined, in the manner of Cheyenne legal
principles. The question of whether a contract has been made
now looks very much like the Cheyenne question of whether an
enforceable marriage agreement has been made; 24 in both
instances the answer is always, "It depends."
Papke's second example is the modification of contracts.
Under pre-UCC law, modifying a contract was a process that
required several formalities. The UCC throws them out, and
allows "all necessary and desirable modification of sales
contracts without regard to the technicalities, which at present
hamper such adjustments., 2 6 Once again, this was the sort of
pragmatic, seat-of-the-pants approach with which the Cheyennes
were comfortable, but Anglo-American lawyers typically are not.
A third example involves the pervasive concept of "usage
of trade,"2 7 which is often decisive in the interpretation and
enforcement of ambiguous or incomplete sales contracts. It is
defined in section 1-205(1) of the Code as "any practice or
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a
place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be
observed.",28  As Papke observes, this definition is purely
operational. The Code does not require a usage to be
consciously appreciated by the parties. Rather, if those in the
marketplace regularly act in accordance with a particular usage,
then it should be given the force of law. This is consistent with
the idea of cultural norms, which are identified by their capacity
to account for behavior. By directing the courts to give effect to
such norms, the UCC strives for consistency with cultural values,
23 See UCC § 1-206(1) (1993).
24 See LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 11, at 169-71.
25 See Papke, supra note 10, at 1473-74.
26 UCC § 1-209, Official Comment 1 (1993).
27 See Papke, supra note 10, at 1477-79.
28 UCC § 1-205(1).
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which was one of the principal virtues that Llewellyn and Hoebel
saw in the Cheyenne law-ways.
By incorporating into the Code concepts like usage of
trade, Llewellyn also set in motion a particular form of legal
evolution.29 In many contexts, rapid changes in the commercial
environment have quickly rendered a body of law inadequate or
obsolete. In copyright law, for example, judges and lawyers are
now struggling to figure out how to treat computerized databases,
which were barely envisioned in 1976 when the current law was
drafted. 30 By making commercial law derivative of commercial
culture rather than vice-versa, Llewellyn sought to immunize the
UCC against such problems. His theory was that as the
marketplace evolved, the law would, too, automatically and
without the need for formal intervention. This self-amending
feature of the UCC is also strongly evocative of Cheyenne law-
ways, with their seemingly infinite capacity to adapt informally
to changing cultural circumstances.
These and other examples that Papke adduces make a
persuasive case that the Cheyenne experience was a significant
influence on some of the most innovative features of the UCC.
In its emphasis on flexibility, its willingness to tolerate
ambiguity, its elevation of the practical over the theoretical, and,
above all, its respect for the cultural norms of the marketplace,
the UCC reflects those very features of Cheyenne law that
Llewellyn and Hoebel most admired. It would be difficult to
imagine the UCC emerging in the form it did had its guiding
genius been a lawyer of more conventional experience.
29 See Papke, supra note 10, at 1479-81.
30 See Mary Maureen Brown, Robert M. Bryan & John M. Conley, Database
Protection in a Digital World, 6 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1 (1999), available at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6il/conley.html.
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THE PROPRIETY OF THE CHEYENNE INFLUENCE
Even if persuaded of the reality of the Cheyenne influence
on Llewellyn's drafting of the UCC, one may question whether
an "anthropological" society like the Cheyenne was an
appropriate testing ground for concepts to be used in a complex
industrial society like ours. Llewellyn had been impressed by the
sense of shared values that suffused Cheyenne society. In "the
case of hitch or trouble,, 31 a consensus emerged based on subtle
but universally understood norms. This enabled members of the
society to arrive at broadly accepted resolutions of disputes
without resort to the kinds of explicit and often complex rules
that are the hallmark of the Western legal method. His hope was
clearly that the shared values of the American marketplace would
be the basis of a similar process of consensus building.
The point that Llewellyn may have ignored, however, was
the fundamental difference between Cheyenne society and his
own. The nineteenth-century Cheyenne society that he and
Hoebel reconstructed was a small, face-to-face community in
which everyone knew everyone else. Beyond distinctions based
on age and gender, role differentiation was limited. There were
chiefs whose authority was based primarily on personal stature
and persuasive ability, but otherwise, questions such as, "What
are you?" and, "What do you do?" were meaningless. Whereas
I might answer such questions with, "I'm a politically
schizophrenic Irish Catholic law professor," a Cheyenne would
have said simply, "I'm a Cheyenne."
Moreover, anthropologists are now questioning whether
the sense of shared values that Llewellyn and Hoebel thought
they saw among the Cheyenne has ever been a reality in any
society. On the contrary, anthropologists are now much
concerned with diversity, defiance, and resistance even among
the smallest and simplest cultures. If Llewellyn and Hoebel's
attribution of strongly shared values to the Cheyenne is suspect,
then what about Llewellyn's similar implicit assumption about the
American marketplace of the 1940s? And if that is questionable,
31 LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 11, at 21.
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what would we say about shared values in the electronic
marketplace of the new millennium?
MEETING OF THE MINDS
The meeting of the minds, classical contract law's core
concept, is both fascinating and problematic to anthropologists.
'Minds' are themselves cultural constructs. The idea that these
cultural constructs can 'meet' assumes a number of things,
including sufficient shared knowledge to permit communication,
shared communication norms (compare the contrasting norms of
literacy and orality in the Gateway 2000 case32), a mutually
consistent sense of the other (that is, each party must assume,
"he/she thinks like me"), and a shared understanding of the
cultural meeting place (that is, the substantive norms of
reasonable conduct).
The sociologist Erving Goffman has sensitized social
scientists to the dangers of making such assumptions. In The
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life33 and other works, he
demonstrates the cognitive and cultural complexity of even such
mundane social tasks as greetings and simple requests.
Sociologists and anthropologists apply the term ethnomethodology
to the study of the patterns of shared knowledge and
understandings that enable members of a society to navigate their
way through day-to-day social interactions. One branch of
ethnomethodology, called conversation analysis, is devoted
entirely to the problem of how people manage the intricacies of
natural conversation; its specific interests include turn-taking,
topic management, and the issues raised by overlapping speech.
Ethnomethodologists make pointed use of the verb "do" - as in
"doing stories" or "doing accusations" - to emphasize that even
the most ordinary social tasks require tremendous cultural
competence. Is it not even more difficult to "do contracts?"
32 "If the staff at the other end of the phone... had to read the four-page
statement of terms .... Writing provides benefits for both sides of
commercial transactions." See Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1149.
3 3 ERVING GOFFiAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
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Thus, followers of Goffman, attuned as they are to the hidden
complexity of the ostensibly simple, are not surprised that our
society needs a law of contract, nor that it is voluminous, nor that
failures of shared understanding - or "contract cases," as we
lawyers call them - consume an entire first-year law school
course.
CONCLUSION: CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND
CONTRACTS
The connection between law and anthropology may be of
historical or abstract intellectual interest, but does it have any
practical relevance to contemporary contract law? The Gateway
2000 case suggests that it does. Much of what I have been
discussing comes under the heading of cultural relativism: the
general idea that one's perception of facts, values, and other
things depends on (or, as academics are now given to saying, is
'contingent' on) one's cultural perspective. Cultural relativism
has made significant inroads into criminal and tort law in the
form of the so-called cultural defense. In numerous widely-
reported cases, parties have tried to justify or mitigate their
behavior by explaining it in terms of their particular cultural
understandings. 
34
The Hills' position might also be characterized as a
cultural defense. Gateway argued that the rule-based, document-
driven norms of business culture should control its dealings with
its customers. It treated its understandings as commonsensical,
universal, self-evident. So did Judge Easterbrook, as evidenced
by his references to sense and competence. In arguing for a
more context-based approach, and in denying the absolute
primacy of the written word, the Hills were, in the posture of a
cultural minority, claiming exemption from majority norms. But
34 See, e.g., Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.
1991) (in civil action for rape, plaintiffs permitted to offer expert testimony
about submissiveness of Hmong (Laotian) women to explain failure to report
rapes); People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. App. 1991) (Chinese
immigrant accused of murdering her son allowed to introduce evidence of
Chinese cultural notions of shame).
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Judge Easterbrook saw no place for cultural relativism in the
market - "Where's the sense in that?" 3
5
At one level, Judge Easterbrook's opinion looks like the
embodiment of Llewellyn's vision for the UCC: the law
enforcing the shared cultural norms of the marketplace. As
anthropologists now understand, though, it is problematic to
attribute a shared set of norms and understandings to 'the'
Cheyenne, let alone to 'the' modern American marketplace.
Moreover, even if Llewellyn's vision was in fact a delusion, at
least he pursued it in traditional ethnographic style, seeking to
discover from the bottom up rather than impose from the top
down. Judge Easterbrook's choice of norms, by contrast, is
devoid of ethnographic sensibility; it is openly, even
triumphantly, top-down.
It is not the place of anthropology to criticize Judge
Easterbrook's choice of norms. What anthropology can do is
remind us that it was a choice. A society like ours is full of
norms, some complementary and some conflicting. None is
inherently imbued with 'sense,' nor is any shared by all
'competent adults.' Instead, all are contingent on the holder's
cultural perspective. When lawmakers must decide what norms
to elevate to the status of law, as they often must, it is
disingenuous to claim empirical privilege for the choice.
'Sense,' in other words, is a value, not a fact. While the law
cannot avoid choices among competing cultural norms, it can and
should acknowledge such choices for what they are.
35 Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1149.
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